Abstract-We consider the problem of secure communications over the two-way wiretap channel under a strong secrecy criterion. We improve existing results by developing an achievable region based on strategies that exploit both the interference at the eavesdropper's terminal and cooperation between legitimate users. We leverage the notion of channel resolvability for the multiple-access channel to analyze cooperative jamming and we show that the artificial noise created by cooperative jamming induces a source of common randomness that can be used for secret-key agreement. We illustrate the gain provided by this coding technique in the case of the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, and we show significant improvements for some channel configurations.
Theorem 2] obtained for weak secrecy. In Section IV, the region is improved by introducing the key exchange mechanism proposed in [9] , [11] . We further extend this region by performing secret key generation from a source induced by the noise used in cooperative jamming. Finally, in Section V, we illustrate the achievable region in the Gaussian case. Section VI concludes the paper by discussing possible extensions of this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Notation: Consider two random variables X and Y taking values in alphabets X and Y. Sample values of X and Y are denoted by x and y, respectively; the joint probability law is denoted by p XY , and the marginal probabilities are denoted by p X and p Y , respectively. We suppose all probability laws either discrete or Gaussian. The mutual information between X and Y is the random variable:
We refer to the average of the mutual information random variable as the average mutual information, and denote it by I(X; Y ) E(I(X; Y )), the entropy corresponds to H(X) = I(X; X). The weakly typical set with respect to distribution p X and is denoted A n (X). Finally, we let δ( ) (resp. δ(n)) be a short-hand notation for any function of (resp. n) that goes to zero as goes to zero (resp. n goes to infinity). We also introduce the integer interval a, b consisting of all integers between a and b .
We consider the problem of secure communication over a twoway wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1 , in which:
• a legitimate user called Alice (or transmitter 1) sends message M 1 and estimates M 2 ;
• another legitimate user called Bob (or transmitter 2) sends message M 2 and estimates M 1 ;
• an eavesdropper called Eve observes Z n . We assume the channel is full-duplex, which means Alice and Bob communicate simultaneously over the channel. This assumption is relevant for some communication systems; however, it may be hard to realize in practice and many experimental communication systems operate with half-duplex, potentially yielding lower rates. The analysis of half-duplex channels is left as future work.
Definition 1: A two-way wiretap channel denoted by
consists of two arbitrary input alphabets X 1 and X 2 , three arbitrary output alphabets Y 1 , Y 2 and Z, and a sequence of transition probabilities p Y n 1 Y n 2 Z n |X n 1 X n 2 n 1 such that:
We consider hereafter a memoryless wiretap channel, but we note that our approach and our results generalize in part to arbitrary channels using information spectrum methods [20] .
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
I(X; Y ) i X;Y (X; Y ) where: i X;Y log 2 p XY p X p Y .
We refer to the average of the mutual information random variable as the average mutual information, and denote it by I(X; Y ) E(I(X; Y )), the entropy corresponds to H(X) = I(X; X). The weakly typical set with respect to distribution p X and is denoted A n (X). Finally, we let δ() (resp. δ(n)) be a short-hand notation for any function of (resp. n) that goes to zero as goes to zero (resp. n goes to infinity). We also introduce the integer interval a, b consisting of all integers between a and b.
Definition 1. A two-way wiretap channel denoted by
consists of two arbitrary input alphabets X 1 and X 2 , three arbitrary output alphabets Y 1 , Y 2 and Z, and a sequence of transition probabilities
such that:
Fig. 1. Communication over a two-way wiretap channel
Definition 2. A memoryless two-way wiretap channel (WTC 2 for short) denoted by
is a two-way wiretap channel for which:
Now, we formally define a code for the two-way wiretap channel.
, n two-way wiretap channel code C n consists of: 1) Two message alphabets:
. 2) Two local sources of randomness (R 1 , p R1 ) and (R 2 , p R2 ) independent of the channel and messages. 3) Two sets of encoding functions that map a message and past channel observations to a channel input symbol:
• n encoding functions for transmitter 1:
• n encoding functions for transmitter 2:
4)
Two decoding functions that map channel observations to a message or an error symbol "?":
We also define the following quantities to assess the performance of a code C n :
• the probability of error:
• the information leakage to the eavesdropper:
Definition 4. A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable for a WTC 2 if there exists a sequence of codes {C n } n1 such that:
• lim n→∞ L(C n ) = 0 (Strong secrecy). Definition 2: A memoryless two-way wiretap channel (WTC 2 for short) denoted by X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 , Z, p Y1Y2Z|X1X2 is a twoway wiretap channel for which:
Definition 3: A 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n two-way wiretap channel code C n consists of: 1) Two message alphabets:
2) Two local sources of randomness (R 1 , p R1 ) and (R 2 , p R2 ) independent of the channel and messages. 3) Two sets of encoding functions that map a message and past channel observations to a channel input symbol:
4) Two decoding functions that map channel observations to a message or an error symbol "?":
Definition 4: A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable for a WTC 2 if there exists a sequence of codes {C n } n 1 such that:
Definition 5: The strong secrecy capacity regionR
We denote by R 2W the weak secrecy capacity region. We are interested in characterizing the entire region of achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ), but it is rather difficult to obtain a closed-form expression. In principle, the coding scheme in Definition 3 could simultaneously exploit the interference of transmitted signals at the eavesdropper's terminal and feedback.
To obtain some insight, we study instead a simpler strategy that partially decouples these two effects as follows:
• First, we exploit interference to penalize the eavesdropper and increase secure communication rates. The interference can be of two types: interference between codewords or jamming with noise.
• Next, we introduce feedback by means of key exchange and key generation. With key exchange, one user sacrifices part of its secure communication rate to exchange a secret key, whereas with key generation both users exploit channel randomness to distill keys. Those keys are then used to encrypt messages with a one-time pad.
III. RESOLVABILITY-BASED COOPERATIVE JAMMING

A. Cooperative Jamming
A natural attempt to increase secure communication rates consists in jamming Eve with noise, in order to decrease her signalto-noise ratio. This strategy, called cooperative jamming [23] , forces one user to stop transmitting information to jam the eavesdropper. To overcome this limitation, Alice and Bob can use codewords whose interference also has a detrimental effect on Eve without sacrificing as much information rate. This scheme is called coded cooperative jamming and was introduced by Tekin and Yener [7] , [8] . It is possible to combine both strategies and have Alice and Bob perform coded cooperative jamming while simultaneously jamming the eavesdropper with noise. Simultaneous cooperative jamming can be implemented by prefixing an artificial discrete memoryless channel (DMC) before the WTC 2 and sending codewords through the concatenated channels. This technique is therefore called prefixing in [11] .
Note that cooperative jamming does not exploit feedback, which corresponds to using only two encoding functions f in Definition 3. Using cooperative jamming is then equivalent to studying the simplified channel model illustrated in Fig. 2 , in which the eavesdropper observes the output of a multiple-access channel.
B. Achievable Region
We first derive an achievable region using the notion of channel resolvability and auxiliary messages M 1 ∈ M 1 1, 2 nR 1 , uniformly distributed, and M 2 ∈ M 2 1, 2 nR 2 , uniformly distributed, in place of (R 1 , p R1 ) and (R 2 , p R2 ). This region is given in Proposition 1. 
We denote by R 2W the weak secrecy capacity region.
We are interested in characterizing the entire region of achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ), but it is rather difficult to obtain a closed-form expression. In principle, the coding scheme in Definition 3 could simultaneously exploit the interference of transmitted signals at the eavesdropper's terminal and feedback. To obtain some insight, we study instead a simpler strategy that partially decouples these two effects as follows:
III. RESOLVABILITY-BASED COOPERATIVE JAMMING
A. Cooperative Jamming
A natural attempt to increase secure communication rates consists in jamming Eve with noise, in order to decrease her signalto-noise ratio. This strategy, called cooperative jamming [23] , forces one user to stop transmitting information to jam the eavesdropper. To overcome this limitation, Alice and Bob can use codewords whose interference also has a detrimental effect on Eve without sacrificing as much information rate. This scheme is called coded cooperative jamming and was introduced by Tekin & Yener [7] , [8] . It is possible to combine both strategies and have Alice and Bob perform coded cooperative jamming while simultaneously jamming the eavesdropper with noise. Simultaneous cooperative jamming can be implemented by prefixing an artificial discrete memoryless channel (DMC) before the WTC 2 and sending codewords through the concatenated channels. This technique is therefore called prefixing in [11] .
Note that cooperative jamming does not exploit feedback, which corresponds to using only two encoding functions f 2 in Definition 3. Using cooperative jamming is then equivalent to studying the simplified channel model illustrated in Fig. 2 , in which the eavesdropper observes the output of a multiple-access channel.
B. Achievable Region
We first derive an achievable region using the notion of channel resolvability and auxiliary messages M 
where Proj R1,R2 is the projection on the plane of rates (R 1 , R 2 ), and:
factorizing as:
Remark A similar result has been independently established by Yassaee & Aref [24] using a related technique based on approximation of output statistics. However, their proof only holds for discrete memoryless channel because it is based on strongly typical sequences. In our proof, we use Steinberg's results [19] , which hold for Gaussian memoryless channels.
Proof of Proposition 1:
In this proof, we consider two types of transmitted messages. First, the main messages, which must be transmitted between Alice and Bob reliably and securely with respect to Eve. Second, the auxiliary messages, which are used to perform coded cooperative jamming and introduce randomness to mislead the eavesdropper. Although auxiliary messages do not carry information by themselves, we require that Alice and Bob decode them reliably. We also perform simultaneous cooperative jamming by prefixing DMCs.
The proof is based on random coding. We fix distributions p C1 , p C2 , p X1|C1 and p X2|C2 . Let > 0.
Code creation: We create the code as follows:
• Code generation: we generate the codewords at random:
2 according to p C2 . Here, i represents the index of the main message, j the index of the auxiliary message. We denote by C n the random variable representing the generated code and by C n one of its realizations.
• Encoding: If Alice wants to send µ 1 ∈ M 1 × M 1 , she computes c 
Remark A similar result has been independently established by Yassaee and Aref [24] using a related technique based on approximation of output statistics. However, their proof only holds for discrete memoryless channel because it is based on strongly typical sequences. In our proof, we use Steinberg's results [19] , which also hold for Gaussian memoryless channels.
Here, i represents the index of the main message, j the index of the auxiliary message. We denote by C n the random variable representing the generated code and by C n one of its realizations.
• Encoding: If Alice wants to send µ 1 ∈ M 1 × M 1 , she computes c The DMCs with transition probabilities p X1|C1 and p X2|C2 are prefix channels used for simultaneous cooperative jamming to confuse the eavesdropper.
• Decoding: we consider a typical set decoder.
Let us define A n 1, 
Probability of error analysis:
We study the probability of error defined as:
We are looking for conditions on rates such that this probability of error goes to zero as n goes to infinity. We use the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: (Probability of error) For > 0,
Proof: see Appendix A.
Remark Lemma 1 gives conditions for reliable communication regardless of the eavesdropper, which is intuitive because reliability only depends on what is happening between the two legitimate users. However, this differs from the proof in [7] , in which additional reliability constraints that depend on the eavesdropper are introduced to compute the leakage.
Leakage analysis: We study the leakage defined as:
Lemma 2: (Leakage) For > 0,
Proof: see Appendix B.
Remark To interpret this result, we need to precisely understand the role of auxiliary messages M 1 and M 2 . These messages are introduced to replace the sources of randomness and Lemma 2 gives lower bounds on the rates of these auxiliary messages. This result is intuitive: to prevent Eve from recovering the messages, more randomness must be introduced in the encoding process. Lemma 2 shows that there exist minimum values of the rates such that they allow zero asymptotical leakage.
It is important to remember that, because of the constraints imposed by Lemma 1, increasing auxiliary message rates reduces the amount of information one can transmit through the channel.
Code selection: By Markov's inequality, we have
therefore, we conclude that there exists a specific sequence of codes {C n } n 1 such that lim
Remark Each code C n consists of a pair of codes (C 1 , C 2 ). Although the codes C 1 and C 2 are generated according to independent distributions, note that both codes are jointly selected; therefore, the codes are used independently by Alice and Bob but optimized jointly to guarantee secrecy.
Conclusion: For any
> 0, there exists a code such that the probability of error and the leakage are smaller than δ( ). Therefore, it is possible to create a sequence of codes {C n ( n )} n 1 with n −→ n→∞ 0. By combining the rate constraints in (6) and (8), we get the result given in Proposition 1.
By elimination of the auxiliary rates R 1 and R 2 , we obtain the following region:
Corollary 1 (Strongly secure achievable region):
where: P = {p X1X2C1C2Y1Y2Z factorizing as:
Proof of Corollary 1: With (3) and (8), we have:
Using (3) and (8), we also have:
Similarly, we have:
The region described in (9) is identical to the one obtained by Tekin and Yener in [7] , [8] for weak secrecy. However, a closer look at the proof shows that their result is obtained by projecting the region R defined as:
This region differs from the one in Proposition 1 in the constraints on auxiliary message rates (R 1 , R 2 ). The difference is shown in Fig. 3 , where the dark area corresponds to constraints (8) and the light one to the constraints on (R 1 , R 2 ) in (11) . Note that the latter corresponds to the achievable region of a multiple access channel (MAC). This is not surprising because the proof of (11) relies explicitly on the analysis of the probability of error for the eavesdropper, who obtains its signal through a virtual multiple access channel as shown in Fig. 2 . In contrast, our approach analyzes the secrecy constraint directly, which leads to lower bounds on the auxiliary message rate required to confuse the eavesdropper. The projection of both regions on the plane of rates (R 1 , R 2 ) is the same because it corresponds to having the auxiliary message rates on the diagonal edge, which is common to both. In terms of code structure, the approach of Tekin and Yener consists in augmenting the number of auxiliary messages until the leakage to the eavesdropper become negligible, which only happens on the slope of the MAC region. Our constraints directly give a region with negligible leakage and the approach consists in finding the minimum number of auxiliary messages needed to confuse the eavesdropper, and, therefore, augmenting the number of secret messages to the maximum possible value.
This region differs from the one in Proposition 1 in the constraints on auxiliary message rates (R 1 , R
2 ). The difference is shown in Fig. 3 , where the dark area corresponds to constraints (8) and the light one to the constraints on (R 1 , R 2 ) in (11) . Note that the latter corresponds to the achievable region of a multiple access channel (MAC). This is not surprising because the proof of (11) relies explicitly on the analysis of the probability of error for the eavesdropper, who obtains its signal through a virtual multiple access channel as shown in Fig. 2 . In contrast, our approach analyzes the secrecy constraint directly, which leads to lower bounds on the auxiliary message rate required to confuse the eavesdropper. The projection of both regions on the plane of rates (R 1 , R 2 ) is the same because it corresponds to having the auxiliary message rates on the diagonal edge, which is common to both. In terms of code structure, the approach of Tekin & Yener consists in augmenting the number of auxiliary messages until the leakage to the eavesdropper become negligible, which only happens on the slope of the MAC region. Our constraints directly give a region with negligible leakage and the approach consists in finding the minimum number of auxiliary messages needed to confuse the eavesdropper, and, therefore, augmenting the number of secret messages to the maximum possible value. Fig. 3 . Constraints on R 1 and R 2 in (8) and (11) IV. KEY EXCHANGE AND KEY GENERATION
In the previous section, we have exploited the benefits of coded cooperative jamming and simultaneous cooperative jamming, but we did not exploit the possibility of feedback. We introduce feedback with two mechanisms:
• we use the technique of [9] and [11] to transfer secret rate from one user to the other;
• we use the randomness introduced by cooperative jamming to induce a source from which we generate secret keys.
Note that we can only exchange information through a ratelimited channel; therefore, we rely on results for secret key agreement with rate-limited public communication [16] , [17] .
A. Key Exchange
We introduce key exchange on top of the cooperative jamming scheme introduced in Section III by splitting the main and auxiliary messages into multiple parts. We use these sub-messages as a means to exchange a key using the secret channel and encrypt part of the public message. Because of the "secret rate transfer" we need to redefine which rates we are considering.
Let us consider a code for cooperative jamming with secret message rates (R 1 , R 2 ) and auxiliary messages rates (R 1 , R 2 ). For i ∈ {1, 2}, we split the main message M i into two parts:
• A key, which is used for encryption by the other user:
; user i needs to sacrifice a part of its secret message to transmit this key.
• A secret message: S i ∈ S i = 1, 2 nR s i ; this part corresponds to the part of secret message user i does not sacrifice. We also split the auxiliary message M i in two parts:
• A message E i , which is encrypted with the key sent by the other user to giveĒ i ∈ E i = 1, 2
Encryption is done with a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy [25] .
• An open message:
; this corresponds to the part of the message that remains public and still perfectly decodable by the receiver. By convention, if no key is available R e i = 0, else, by construction, R
Therefore, we have the following relationships between the various rates:
Although (R 1 , R 2 , R 1 , R
2 ) still represents the rates provided by cooperative jamming, they are no longer the rates of interest after key exchange. In fact, part of the auxiliary message is encrypted while part of the secret message is sacrificed to exchange a key. Hence, the rates we need to consider are the following:
• a pair of secret rates:
• a pair of public rates:R
Remark Because the key sent by one user cannot be used simultaneously by the other, the key exchange scheme must operate in several rounds. At each round, we use the key sent in the previous one, except in the first round where no key is available. If we use a code of length n B times, we obtain a new code of length n = Bn; the first message does not use key exchange, but the next B − 1 do. If the communication rate for the first message is R * , for the B − 1 others it is R, and the overall rate isR, we have:
Thus, the first round incurs a negligible rate penalty for B going to infinity. (8) and (11) IV. KEY EXCHANGE AND KEY GENERATION
• A message E i , which is encrypted with the key sent by the other user to giveĒ i ∈ E i = 1, 2 nR e i . Encryption is done with a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy [25] .
Although (R 1 , R 2 , R 1 , R 2 ) still represents the rates provided by cooperative jamming, they are no longer the rates of interest after key exchange. In fact, part of the auxiliary message is encrypted while part of the secret message is sacrificed to exchange a key. Hence, the rates we need to consider are the following:
• a pair of public rates:
Thus, the first round incurs a negligible rate penalty for B going to infinity.
For weak secrecy, [11] proves the following proposition: Proposition 2 (El Gamal et al.):
Based on Section III, we also have this result for strong secrecy:
Remark By comparing (9) and (13), we see that key exchange improves the individual bounds on R 1 and R 2 , but not the bound on the sum-rate. Individual bounds on R 1 and R 2 actually correspond to the capacity of the channel between the two users and cannot be improved; therefore, any improvement on the region should modify the sum-rate constraint.
B. Key Generation from Induced Source
Key exchange requires sacrificing part of the secret rate of one user. In addition, we can use the channel randomness introduced for simultaneous cooperative jamming to extract secret keys. Although users must exchange additional messages to agree on a common secret key, key generation only comes at the expense of public message rate.
In the next section, we study the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel and we explicitly show how cooperative jamming induces a discrete memoryless source (DMS) X ,Ỹ ,Z independent of all other observations, which can be used to distill a secret key. The existence of this DMS is not obvious because the noise introduced by cooperative jamming is already exploited to harm the eavesdropper and it is a priori unclear if it could be used simultaneously as a source of common randomness for secretkey agreement. We start by clarifying what knowledge of the eavesdropper needs to be considered to identify the DMS. Let K be the secret key to generate and let M 1 , M 2 , M 1 and M 2 be the secret and auxiliary messages used in the cooperative jamming code. The key and secret messages must be independent and both must be hidden from the eavesdropper, that is for > 0,
. Notice that
The term I(M 1 M 2 ; Z n ) can be smaller than /2 by construction of the cooperative jamming code but note that we must then have I(K; Z n M 1 M 2 ) /2; this means that the key must be hidden from an eavesdropper having access not only to the observation Z n but also to the secret messages M 1 and M 2 . Furthermore, note that
If the cooperative jamming code is chosen to provide the highest secrecy rate, the public message rates must be chosen to lie on the boundary of the region in (9), for which [7] , [8] shows that
In this case, we obtain:
In other words, we can assume that the key K must be kept secret from an eavesdropper observing not only the channel output Z n but also knowing the secret and auxiliary messages transmitted by the legitimate users.
C. Achievable region with key exchange and key generation
In this section, we provide a generic strategy and an achievable region based on cooperative jamming, key exchange and key generation. We assume the existence of a DMS (X,Ỹ ,Z) independent of all other observations induced by cooperative jamming. The statistics of the DMS depend both on channel statistics and the code used for communications, but we do not attempt to characterize them exactly.
First, note that substituting the rates defined in (12) in Proposition 1 gives a set of constraints that achievable rates must satisfy:
In order to add a key generation step, we need to further split message rates in multiple parts. For instance, Alice modifies her rates as follows:
Secret key generation does not change anything for the secret message rate.
•R k
Secret key generation does not change anything for the secret key rate used for key exchange.
•R o 
where the random variables U and V are such that U ↔ V ↔ Y ↔XZ forms a Markov chain and
Depending on which user performs public discussion and which user encrypts a message we obtain additional constraints onR p andR k . Specifically, we have four possible configurations given in Table I .
TABLE I ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR KEY GENERATION
Although we do not attempt to obtain a closed-form expression, note that key generation can loosen the sum-rate constraint in (13) .
V. GAUSSIAN TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we evaluate an achievable region based on the strategies developed in previous sections. We consider a Gaussian two-way wiretap channel for which the relationships between inputs and outputs are:
In addition the inputs are subject to the power constraints:
We suppose the additive noises N n 21 , N n 12 , and N n e are i.i.d. zeromean unit-variance Gaussian vectors. We implement cooperative jamming by prefixing an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel before each input of WTC 2 . This is equivalent to considering a modified channel with inputs C 1 and C 2 , with:
where N ρ 2 , and obtain the modified power constraints:
With minor modifications of the proof of Section III to account for the power constraints, we obtain an achievable region for the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel by substituting the random variables 
A. Randomness Source Extraction
We provide an explicit characterization of the DMS induced by cooperative jamming, which we will use to extract a key later on. Define:
The triple (X,Ỹ ,Z) withX = (X 1 ,Ỹ 1 ) and Y = (X 2 ,Ỹ 2 ) is an independent DMS that can be used for key generation. Alice, Bob and Eve observe the componentsX,Ỹ , andZ, respectively.
Proof: Since Alice generates the noise N 11 , she obtainsX 1 directly. She also observes the channel output
; since she knows X n 1 and can decode C n 2 with high probability, she can obtainỸ 1 . Similarly, Bob can obtainX 2 andỸ 2 . Eve observes the channel output
and, as discussed in Section IV, we assume she obtains C n 1 and C n 2 as side-information. Therefore, Eve can computeZ, but we also need to show thatZ n is a sufficient statistic forX
. This is the case because:
The DMS (X,Ỹ ,Z) is a vector source, and we do not have a closed-form expression for the secret key capacity with rate limited public-rate communication. However, if Alice and Bob ignore one of their observations, the DMS reduces to a degraded scalar source. By [17, Corollary 2] , there exists a function f with closed-form expression such that:
• If Alice ignoresỸ 1 and Bob ignoresX 2 , we haveỸ 2 ↔ X 1 ↔Z. In this case, if Bob sends public messages at ratē R p , Alice and Bob can distill a key at rateR k , such that
• If Bob ignoresỸ 2 and Alice ignoresX 1 , we haveỸ 1 ↔ X 2 ↔Z. In this case, if Alice sends public messages at rateR p , Alice and Bob can distill a key at rateR k , such thatR k f R p , pỸ
1X2Z
. With the explicit characterization of the DMS induced by cooperative jamming and the function f , it is possible to compute new achievable rates for the strategy described in Section IV. Although we do not have a closed-form expression for the resulting regionR K , it is possible to prove that the region strictly includes the regionR . There exists channels such thatR
The first statement follows directly from the definition of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second statement, consider the example of a channel for which: Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
In this case I(C 1 ; Y 2 |X 2 ) < I(C 1 ; Z) and I(C 2 ; Y 1 |X 1 ) < I(C 2 ; Z), and the regionR F is empty. However, since the power constraints are non-zero, a fraction of the power can be used to induce a DMS while still maintaining a positive auxiliary message rate. By [17, Theorem 3] , it is possible to obtain a non-zero key rate and, therefore, a non-zero secure communication rate.
Remark Although we only proveR 
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation provides little gain because cooperative jamming leaves little room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the regionR . A secret key can be extracted from the DMS induced by Alice; however, since h 1 = 10, Eve's source observation is highly correlated to Alice's, which severely limits key rates. The upper right corner of the region corresponds to a situation in which both Alice and Bob use their entire power to transmit (i.e. ρ c 1 = ρ 1 and ρ c 2 = ρ 2 ) and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot the regionR obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over Gaussian channel; therefore, the regionR provides an estimate of rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known outer regionR out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by He & Yener [26] . in which Eve obtains a better observation than either Alice and Bob and in which Alice and Bob have little power available. In such a case, key generation provides a significant improvement. Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the regionR F andR K obtained for ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 0.9, h 1 = h 2 = 10, and g 1 = g 2 = 1. In this casē R F = ∅, but key generation is possible. This case corresponds to the situation used in the proof of Proposition 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have developed an achievable region of strongly secure rates based on strategies that partially decouple the use of interference and feedback for secrecy. We have first exploited interference by using a cooperative jamming strategy on top of which we have introduced some basic feedback mechanisms. We have relied on key exchange to transfer secure rate between users and we have performed key generation to distill secret keys from the noise sources induced by cooperative jamming. Numerical results in the Gaussian case have shown significant improvement in some cases.
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions. First, note that the key generation process we considered is based on one-way communication between the two users. There exist sources for which two-way communication is provably better than one-way communication [3] ; we can exhibit a wiretap In this case I(C 1 ; Y 2 |X 2 ) < I(C 1 ; Z) and I(C 2 ; Y 1 |X 1 ) < I(C 2 ; Z), and the regionR F is empty. However, since the power constraints are non-zero, a fraction of the power can be used to induce a DMS while still maintaining a positive auxiliary message rate. By [17, Theorem 3] , it is possible to obtain a non-zero key rate and, therefore, a non-zero secure communication rate.
Remark Although we only proveR F R K by exhibiting a dummy example, our numerical results in the next section clearly show improvements in various cases.
B. Numerical results
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation provides little gain because cooperative jamming leaves little room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the regionR and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot the regionR obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over Gaussian channel; therefore, the regionR provides an estimate of rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known outer regionR out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by He and Yener [26] . Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
We first consider a situation in which secret key generation provides little gain because cooperative jamming leaves little room for improvement. Fig. 4 illustrates the regionR and, therefore, no DMS is induced. For comparison, we also plot the regionR obtained using key generation alone (no cooperative jamming). Although this strategy is clearly suboptimal, note that there exist practical coding schemes for key generation over Gaussian channel; therefore, the regionR provides an estimate of rates achievable with current codes. We also plot the best known outer regionR out for the two-way wiretap channel computed by He & Yener [26] . 
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions. First, note that the key generation process we considered is based on one-way communication between the two users. There exist sources for which two-way communication is provably better than one-way communication [3] ; we can exhibit a wiretap Proof: The first statement follows directly from the definition of the key generation strategy in Section IV. For the second statement, consider the example of a channel for which:
B. Numerical results
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions. First, note that the key generation process we considered is based on one-way communication between the two users. There exist sources for which two-way communication is provably better than one-way communication [3] ; we can exhibit a wiretap 
Our results can naturally be extended in several directions. First, note that the key generation process we considered is based on one-way communication between the two users. There exist sources for which two-way communication is provably better than one-way communication [3] ; we can exhibit a wiretap channel based on those sources for which the same result would hold. Second, we can extend the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel to multiple antennas by relying on the results of Khisti and Wornell [27] and Oggier and Hassibi [28] for the MIMO wiretap channel, and Watanabe and Oohama [17] for secret key agreement from vector sources. Third, we could generalize our results to more than two legitimate users. While this poses no major conceptual problem, generalizing Lemma 2 might not be so straightforward. Fourth, the results obtained for the Gaussian case rely on an explicit characterization of the DMS induced by cooperative jamming; it would be interesting to generalize the approach beyond channels with an additive noise structure. Finally, our results generalize to known channels with memory, such as wireless channels with ergodic fading [29] , [30] , by using the general result of Steinberg on channel resolvability for the multiple-access channel [19] . and M 2 2 nR 2 , and let C be the random variable representing a randomly generated code. Let 1 > 0. We show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to the transmission of a single message: E(P e (C)) = E    = E(P e (C|1, 1 sent)) (b) E(P(µ 1 =μ 1 |1, 1 sent, C)) + E(P(µ 2 =μ 2 |1, 1 sent, C)). (23) Equality (a) follows from the symmetry of the random code construction, while inequality (b) is given by the union bound.
APPENDIX
Each term can be expressed using the following events:
• E(i, j) = (X 
The second inequality follows from the union bound, and the penultimate from the AEP.
If the rate constraints in (6) are satisfied, there exists a γ > 0 such that R 2 + R 2 < I(Y 1 ; C 2 |X 1 ) − γ, and choosing such that γ + 3 > 0, we obtain:
lim n→∞ E C (P(µ 2 =μ 2 |1, 1 sent, C)) δ( ).
By symmetry, we obtain, by a similar reasoning on F:
lim n→∞ E C (P (µ 1 =μ 1 |1, 1 sent, C) An upper bound for the leakage using divergence:
Taking the expectation and using the symmetry of the random code construction, yields:
1 C
2 ; Z n > Now, we study each term individually:
• First, J (1) can be upper-bounded as follows: and to apply the Chernoff bound, we have:
e −αγ− n .
• With a similar reasoning, we can upper bound J (2) , J
, and J (4) by quantities going exponentially to zero under the given conditions. Conclusion: : J goes exponentially to zero as n goes to infinity. Therefore, lim n→∞ E(L(C)) δ( ).
QED
